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SpeculationThe objective of this study is to explore empirical evidence on the quantitative importance of supply,
demand, and market shocks for price changes in international food commodity markets. To this end, it
distinguishes between root, conditional, and internal drivers of price changes using three empirical mod-
els: (1) a price spike model where monthly food price returns (spikes) are estimated against oil prices,
supply and demand shocks, and excessive speculative activity; (2) a volatility model where annualized
monthly variability of food prices is estimated against the same set of variables plus a ﬁnancial crises
index; and (3) a trigger model that estimates extreme values of price spikes and volatility using quantile
regressions. The results point to the increasing linkages among food, energy, and ﬁnancial markets, which
explain much of the observed food price spikes and volatility. While ﬁnancial speculation ampliﬁes short-
term price spikes, oil price volatility intensiﬁes medium-term price volatility.
 2013 The authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
The global food system recently showed exceptional interna-
tional commodity price developments. In 2007–2008, the nominal
prices of almost all food commodities increased by more than 50%.
Three years after the 2007–2008 global food price spikes, food
prices surged again in 2010–2011 (Fig. 1). Though the two events
were different in terms of affected commodities,4 a strong correla-
tion among most food prices was registered. More important, prices
of all food commodities soared above the long-term average, with an
adverse impact on poor people in poor countries (Conforti, 2004;
Dawe, 2008; Dorosh et al., 2009; Hernandez et al., 2011). Indeed,
the sudden increase in international food prices and its transmission
to domestic prices led to rising inﬂation rates, which mainly hurt thepoor, who spend large shares of their income on staple foods. Vola-
tility causes economic uncertainty and may result in lower invest-
ment, especially in small businesses lacking access to credit.
Although on global markets food grains are viewed mainly as
commodities, they constitute the basic food of the poor and the ‘‘cur-
rency’’ of the poorest 2 billion people.
Faced with rising food insecurity, social unrest, and accelerated
inﬂation driven by food prices, developing and advanced countries
as well as international governmental and nongovernmental orga-
nizations began to respond with a new sense of urgency. For
instance, the G20 agenda of 2011 addressed food security. None-
theless, although the price crises of 2007–2008 and 2010–2011
have led to some policy changes, the sense of urgency about pre-
venting human suffering has not yet translated into comprehen-
sive actions related to world food supply and demand.
Unstable food prices at national and regional levels are not a
new phenomenon. Some consider the 2007–2008 price spike
part of normal price instability caused by temporary shocks
(Díaz-Bonilla and Ron, 2010). In fact, average price volatility did
not differ signiﬁcantly between the 1970s and the late 2000s, but
the nature of the volatility and its causes are different. Traditional
market fundamentals—that is, demand and supply factors—were
found inadequate to explain the extreme price spikes in
2007–2008 and 2010–2011.
In the past few years, many studies have been carried out to
investigate the causes of and solutions to soaring food prices
(Abbott et al., 2009, 2011; Gilbert, 2010; Roache, 2010). They have
identiﬁed a set of drivers of food price upsurges including biofuel
Fig. 1. FAO food price indices from January 2004 to November 2011. Source: FAO (2011).
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aggressive stockpiling policies, trade restrictions, macroeconomic
shocks to money supply, exchange rates, and economic growth.
The relative importance and actual impact of these causes have
been widely discussed. While there is a certain consensus regard-
ing the effects of weather, biofuel production, and export restric-
tions on food commodity markets, the dispute surrounding
speculation is far from settled. Most of the empirical studies focus
primarily on Granger causality tests to explain the role of specula-
tion in price returns or volatility (Irwin et al., 2009; Robles et al.,
2009; Gilbert, 2010). Another strand of research seeks to identify
bubble behavior—that is, explosive increases in prices—in com-
modity markets during 2007–2008 (Gilbert, 2009; Phillips and
Yu, 2011; Shi and Arora, 2012). Granger causality tests, however,
are criticized for presuming a time-lag structure that might be
too long to allow for observing any reaction of liquid ﬁnancial mar-
kets (Gilbert and Pfuderer, 2012; Grosche, 2012). Analysis of bub-
bles can identify abnormal price behavior but does not explain the
causes of the observed price increases.
This study goes a step further by examining the impact of spec-
ulation and agricultural fundamentals on price spikes and volatil-
ity, where price spikes are the short-term ups and downs of
prices following short-term shocks and volatility is the variability
of price around its trend. The distinction between price spikes
and volatility is more important from a welfare perspective than
trends in overall price levels because price spikes and volatility
are the primary indicators of food crises.5 Furthermore, this distinc-
tion is also essential to differentiate among factors that generate
risks for poor consumers to cope, and uncertainties for agricultural
investors to plan. We argue that a food crisis is more closely related
to extreme price spikes, while long-term volatility is more strongly
connected to general price risks.
In particular, this study provides empirical evidence on the
quantitative importance of widely discussed determinants of com-
modity prices. In our empirical analysis, we consider agricultural
supply shocks, stock-to-use ratios, demand shocks (energy prices
and gross domestic product [GDP]), and futures market shocks
(speculative activity in commodity futures trading and ﬁnancial
crises). The empirical analysis is carried out using three models:
(1) a price spike model where monthly food price returns (spikes)
are estimated against oil prices, supply shocks, stock-to-use ratios,5 Although there is no universally agreed-on deﬁnition of ‘‘food crisis,’’ here it is
understood as an abrupt and unanticipated change that affects people severely and
negatively.demand shocks, and volume of speculative futures trading; (2) a
volatility model where annualized monthly variability of food
prices is estimated against yearly observable variables such as sup-
ply shocks, stock-to-use ratios, economic growth, volume of
speculative futures trading, oil price volatility, and a ﬁnancial cri-
ses index; and (3) a trigger model that estimates extreme values
of price spikes and volatility using quantile regressions. The
adopted methodology will allow us to shed light on the formation
of price spikes and price risks rather than simply so-called ‘‘high
food prices.’’ The food commodity prices under investigation are
for wheat, maize, and soybeans.6 The rest of the paper is organized
as follows: Section ‘Conceptual framework’ presents the conceptual
framework of the approach. Sections ‘Estimation methods’ and ‘Data’
describe the setup of the adopted models and the variables included
in the empirical analysis. Section ‘Results and discussion’ discusses
the econometric results. Section ‘Conclusion’ concludes.Conceptual framework
The recent literature identiﬁes the determinants of food price
hikes as biofuel demand, speculation in commodity futures mar-
kets, and macroeconomic shocks. These determinants represent
the demand and supply side of the world food equation. In an
attempt to distinguish how different factors affect price changes,
three groups of potential causes have been singled out: exogenous
shocks, also called ‘‘root’’ causes; ‘‘conditional’’ causes; and ‘‘inter-
nal’’ drivers (Fig. 2). Root causes, such as extreme weather events,
oil price shocks, production shocks, and demand shocks, are inde-
pendent core factors affecting food price ﬂuctuations. They are
exogenous because the possibility of a causal relationship going
from the agricultural sector to root causes is minimal. The exoge-
nous shocks are expected to generate food price spikes and volatil-
ity, and the magnitude of their impacts depends partly on the
political and economic environment of a given country. In other
words, a second group of factors related to speciﬁc political and
economic conditions – labeled here as conditional drivers—can
dampen or exacerbate the exogenous shocks. Some of these factors
(such as a high concentration of production or low transparency in
commodity markets) are rather time-invariant and difﬁcult to
measure; they are therefore not considered in the empirical analy-
sis of this article. The third group of causes consists of factors that
are triggered by the same price dynamics, and these internal
causes are endogenous shock-ampliﬁers and include discretionary6 We do not include rice because of its different international market patterns.
Fig. 2. Stylized framework of the causes of global food price volatility and spikes. Note: Exogenous shocks are the ‘‘root’’ causes of price volatility and price spikes. To what
extent exogenous shocks translate to food price changes depends on the market conditions and political environment of a given country (‘‘conditional’’ causes). Food price
shocks can further be ampliﬁed by non-linear endogenous responses (‘‘internal’’ causes) to food price shocks. The factors in italics are not considered in the econometric
analysis as they are time-invariant or as there is no appropriate quantitative indicator available. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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and declines in world food stocks. The present study focuses pri-
marily on exogenous shocks because they may be the major root
factors that stimulate the emergence of the other factors. At the
same time, special attention is given to the (partly) endogenous
factors of speculation and food stocks.
There is a caveat to this categorization of drivers: the line dis-
tinguishing endogenous and exogenous causes is very subtle. There
are multiple and complex interactions between factors, and drivers
inﬂuence each other through various linkages and feedback loops.
For example, restrictive trade policies induced by price increases
have further contributed to price surges. Likewise, low US stock-
to-use ratios have been considered an important factor in
increased price volatility. Low stock levels are, however, caused
by reduced government activities in public storage (exogenous)
as well as current supply and price expectations (endogenous), as
highlighted by Piesse and Thirtle (2009). Furthermore, the UNCTAD
2011 Report on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2011) indicated
that there could be some correlations among different factors.
For example, extreme weather may render ﬁnancial investment
in commodity futures more attractive. However, empirical evi-
dence suggests that the correlation among these variables is not
strong (Appendix A).
Fig. 2 shows that extreme weather events such as droughts and
ﬂoods—exacerbated by global warming—are considered a root
cause of global food price ﬂuctuations because they cause crop fail-
ure and reduce global food supply with a consequent increase in
prices. In this analysis, we used short-term global food supply ﬂuc-
tuation and its projection as an indicator of extreme weather
changes.
A second root cause consists of oil price shocks, which affect
grain commodity prices in a number of ways. On the supply side,
a rise in oil prices exerts upward pressure on input costs such as
fertilizer, irrigation, and transportation costs. The rise in costs in
turn leads to a decline in proﬁtability and production, with a con-
sequent rise in commodity prices. On the demand side, higher
crude oil prices induce a higher derived demand for maize and soy-
beans and other grains such as wheat destined for biofuel produc-
tion and thus result in higher prices of these grains. The demand
for biofuels has been further facilitated by indirect and direct sub-sidies and biofuel mandates. Both the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, for instance, have adopted mandatory blending
policies that require a sharp increase in their use. Studies have
shown that higher biofuel demand and energy mandates have a
large impact on food prices (Mitchel, 2008; Chen et al., 2010;
Chakravorty et al., 2011). A further linkage between oil and agricul-
tural prices operates through index investments. Tang and Xiong
(2012) found an increasing correlation between futures prices of
agricultural commodities and oil after 2004 when signiﬁcant index
investments started to ﬂow into commodity markets. The two
authors highlighted that the stronger correlation with oil prices
was signiﬁcantly more pronounced for indexed commodities than
for off-index commodities, because oil is an important index
constituent (Basak and Pavlova, 2013).
A third root cause is the high demand mainly from emerging
markets, primarily China and India. In Krugman’s words (2010),
rising commodity prices are a sign that ‘‘we are living in a ﬁnite
world, in which the rapid growth of emerging economies is placing
pressure on limited supplies of raw materials, pushing up their
prices.’’ In addition, economic development and income growth
are changing not only the quantity of food demanded, but also
the structure of demand for food commodities. As dietary patterns
move away from starchy foods toward meat and dairy products,
there is an intensifying demand for feed grains that drives their
prices up (von Braun, 2011).
Other root causes of price increases are economic shocks, such
as the depreciation of the US dollar, the currency of choice for most
international commodity transactions. These shocks put upward
pressure on demand from non-US dollar commodity consumers
and producers.
While there is a certain consensus on the impact of some root
causes, such as oil prices and extreme weather conditions, on food
prices, the debate about some internal causes is still open. In par-
ticular, it is highly debatable whether speculation has exacerbated
food price volatility. Two conﬂicting hypotheses prevail: the per-
fect market hypothesis and the speculative bubble hypothesis.
The ﬁrst, sometimes referred to as ‘‘traditional speculation’’
hypothesis, argues that speculation helps to stabilize prices by
facilitating increased liquidity and improved price discovery in
the market. The second hypothesis claims that speculation tends
7 Using a standard ordinary least squares model, however, gives similar results:
signs and signiﬁcances, as well as the order of magnitude of the coefﬁcients, remain
the same.
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the commodity exchanges. The UNCTAD (2011) report elaborated
in detail the different types of herd behavior and how they can
drive prices far away from fundamentals: the basic mechanism is
that traders base their decisions on past price trends rather than
on new information on market fundamentals. This situation makes
it difﬁcult for other market participants to distinguish between
fundamental causes for price increases and the herd behavior–dri-
ven causes and thereby impedes the price formation role of specu-
lation. Even informed traders may not be willing or able to
intervene to correct prices if they can beneﬁt from a potential bub-
ble or if their arbitrage possibilities are limited. Herd behavior can
therefore reinforce price increases, which may also lead to excess
correlation if bubbles spill over to related markets.
Despite some arguments against the importance of speculation
for the 2007–2008 food price hikes (Irwin et al., 2009; Wright,
2011), empirical evidence shows the possibility of the speculative
bubble hypothesis (Robles et al., 2009). An increase in speculative
activities raises the volume of futures trading, with a consequent
increase in futures prices and inventory accumulation. This will
then translate into an increase in spot prices. However, skepticism
remains about the link between volume of futures and futures
price. According to some economists (such as Krugman, 2008),
speculation is a random bet whereby traders’ actions of buying
and selling futures cancel out and hence do not have a signiﬁcant
impact on futures prices. This theoretical skepticism is supported
by a lack of empirical evidence on the accumulation of inventory,
especially in 2007–2008, when prices skyrocketed. If speculative
actions were responsible for the rise in food prices, private inven-
tories should have been accumulated. On the contrary, a substan-
tial decline in global food stocks was registered. This fact has
been a justiﬁcation for the assumed insigniﬁcance of speculation
in causing food price spikes (Krugman, 2008). However, wheat
and maize reserves in the United States did not decline substan-
tially during the 2007–2008 crisis (they declined substantially
after the crisis). And even when stocks decline because of supply
shortage and high prices, grain releases could have been higher
without speculation. This can be answered only by conducting an
econometric analysis and not simply by comparing stocks over
time.
Another aspect of ﬁnancialization refers to investors’ increasing
use of commodity futures contracts as part of a portfolio diversiﬁ-
cation strategy, particularly when other asset classes become less
attractive. This has produced rapid growth in commodity index
investments in recent years. According to the capital asset pricing
model, an optimal portfolio should include assets with low or neg-
ative correlation to riskier high-return assets (such as equity). This
strategy reduces overall portfolio risk. Hence, investors may choose
commodity futures not because they expect increasing commodity
prices but because of the potential of commodity futures to reduce
their overall portfolio risk. In this view, commodities become
attractive if alternative assets such as real estate, bonds, metals,
or gold become too risky or expensive. This process can have sig-
niﬁcant economic consequences for food commodity markets. On
the one hand, the presence of commodity index investors can facil-
itate the sharing of commodity price risk; on the other hand, their
portfolio rebalancing can spill price volatility across commodity
markets (Tang and Xiong, 2012).
Both the theoretical and empirical skepticism require further
explanations and empirics. The current literature uses different
approaches for identifying empirical evidence. For instance, stor-
age modeling and price threshold analyses have been used to eval-
uate accumulation of stocks motivated by speculation (Tadesse
and Guttormsen, 2011); Granger-causality analyses have been
adopted to investigate the relations between futures prices and
spot prices (Robles et al., 2009). In this study, we explore the priceeffects of an ‘‘excessive’’ volume of futures contracts based on the
disaggregated position of futures traders plus a ﬁnancial crisis
index developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The two ﬁnancial
variables together with a set of other fundamental drivers may
shed light on how different sets of exogenous and endogenous
variables affect price spikes and volatility. Our study differs from
existing ones by combining fundamentals-based drivers with
ﬁnancial market–based factors in price changes.
Other internal factors are (1) restrictive trade policies and (2)
declining world food stocks. A host of authors (Yang et al., 2008;
Headey, 2011; Martin and Anderson, 2012) have shown that the
sequence of export restrictions and bans implemented by countries
such as India, Thailand, China, and Russia helped to create panics in
international markets and exacerbated price increases. Trade
restrictions are designed to curtail the effects of higher global
prices on domestic prices and to protect consumers. From the per-
spective of a single country, restrictive policies seem to have the
desired effect: as world prices overshoot, domestic prices are
shielded from the full impact. The effect on the world market, how-
ever, is negative. When many countries restrict exports, so much
food disappears from global markets that prices rocket higher than
they would have if governments had not intervened. Inventory
stock levels have a crucial role in commodity pricing and at the
same time are affected by commodity prices. When prices are
low, rational ﬁrms tend to store some units of the commodity,
and total demand equals demand for current use plus demand
from inventory holders. Thus positive inventory implies that total
demand is more elastic than demand for current use. When prices
are high, storage is unproﬁtable, inventory goes to zero, and total
demand equals current-use demand.Estimation methods
We differentiate between price spikes, volatility, and trends.
Since trends are somewhat anticipated long-term price changes
that have little relevance for food crises, this study focuses only
on price spikes and volatility.
A price spike is a large, quick, and temporary rise or fall in price
following a short-term shock. Price spikes can cause crises for con-
sumers, investors, and farmers. Food price spikes are usually mea-
sured using the logarithm of period-over-period prices. Formally:
d ln Pt ¼ ln PtPt1
 
; ð1Þ
where t =m  y, m denotes the month, and y denotes the year. To
capture the contemporaneous correlation of shocks across com-
modities, a seemingly unrelated regression has been used to esti-
mate spikes of maize, wheat, and soybean prices.7 The model is
speciﬁed as
d ln Pt ¼ bRt þ et; ð2Þ
where d lnPt is a Ix1 vector of price spikes (returns) with I number
of commodities identiﬁed as i = 1,2,3 , . . . I; Rt is a vector of explan-
atory variables that include monthly supply shocks, oil price spikes,
economic shocks, beginning stock-to-use ratios, and excessive vol-
ume of speculative futures; and et = I  1 is the error term where
cov (eit, ejt)– 0 for i– j. Some of the Rt are commodity speciﬁc, such
as supply shocks and excessive volumes of speculative futures. Oth-
ers are general.
Monthly supply shocks are measured as log ratios of the US
Department of Agriculture forecasts on global production
Table 1




Production shock (%), led 0.8607*** 0.8124*** 1.1293**
(3.84) (3.46) (2.23)
Speculation (1000 contracts) 0.000070*** 0.000072*** 0.000086***
(8.00) (7.34) (4.73)
Beginning stock-to-use ratio 0.0004 0.0005 0.0016
(0.84) (0.96) (1.11)
Oil price spike (%) 0.0146 0.0623 0.0958*
(0.44) (1.59) (1.69)
GDP shocks (%) 1.2333* 0.2324 1.8303*
(1.73) (0.23) (1.67)
Constant 0.0204** 0.0208** 0.0439
(2.12) (2.04) (1.54)
Wheat price spike
Production shock (%), led 1.4537*** 0.2039 2.7769***
(2.93) (0.39) (3.21)
Speculation (1000 contracts) 0.000206*** 0.000295*** 0.000387***
(5.37) (7.40) (3.44)
Beginning stock-to-use ratio 0.0006 0.0020 0.0032**
(0.64) (1.60) (2.17)
Oil price spike (%) 0.0375 0.0631* 0.1277**
(1.05) (1.70) (2.13)
GDP shocks (%) 2.0971** 0.1329 2.5479**
(2.42) (0.12) (2.02)
Constant 0.0034 0.0674** 0.0799**
(0.15) (2.48) (2.27)
Soybean price spike
Production shock (%), led 0.3413** 0.3218 0.4052**
(2.45) (1.08) (2.45)
Speculation (1000 contracts) 0.000083*** 0.000080*** 0.000136***
(5.98) (4.99) (3.66)
Beginning stock-to-use ratio 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
(0.47) (0.16) (0.13)
Oil price spike (%) 0.0614** 0.0155 0.1514***
(2.07) (0.44) (2.98)
GDP shocks (%) 1.9804*** 1.5647 1.6171⁄
(2.92) (1.45) (1.68)
Constant 0.0204* 0.0157 0.0145
(1.87) (0.98) (0.71)
R2 0.24 0.32 0.21
N 304 167 137
Note: Dependent variable: maize, wheat, and soybean price spike. Values in
parentheses are t-values. All variables refer to monthly data; spikes and shocks (in
%) denote therefore the deviation of that variable from the level in the previous
month. Production shocks are led by 1 month as signiﬁcance and explanatory
power increases. The coefﬁcients for production shock, oil price shock, and GDP
shocks can be interpreted as elasticities (percentage change of commodity price due
to a percentage change of the respective explanatory variable). Speculation refers to
the excessive speculation index given in Eq. (3).
*** Imply level of signiﬁcance at 1% respectively.
** Imply level of signiﬁcance at 5% respectively.
* Imply level of signiﬁcance at 10% respectively.
8 Fewer non-commercial traders are necessary if commercial traders can already
match their different short and long hedges, i.e., when a producer makes a contract
with a processor.
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, as the USDA forecasts are widely recognized and
play an important role for the price formation process that is inﬂu-
enced by monthly information on the available grain supply for the
current agricultural year. Economic shocks are calculated with the
same equation by using monthly interpolated global GDP per
capita (nominal). Stocks-to-use ratios are the fraction of the begin-
ning stocks (of the current agricultural year) and consumption as
forecast by the USDA. Oil price spikes are estimated using the same
procedure as for food commodity spikes (Eq. (1)).
We have hypothesized that the effect of speculative activity on
commodity price dynamics depends on the extent of deviations
between noncommercial and commercial trading activities. How-
ever, many observers, including the US Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC), have recognized that the distinctionbetween commercial and noncommercial is elusive, and hence
measuring speculation relative to hedging can be misleading.
One problem is that small speculators, which together may be
inﬂuential, are exempted from certain reporting obligations.
Another shortcoming is that categorizing traders as noncommer-
cial does not allow for differentiating between traders who specu-
late on information based on fundamentals and those who follow
‘‘irrational herding’’ (UNCTAD, 2011). Both issues can lead to an
underestimation of the impact of speculation due to irrational
herding. Nevertheless, the data on this broad classiﬁcation of trad-
ers constitute the only publicly available source and therefore pro-
vide the only possibility for approximating excessive speculation.
Previous studies (Irwin et al., 2009) have used the Working
index to measure the impact of speculation on food prices. The
Working index tries to measure speculation intensity relative to
hedging activity. It is, however, insensitive to the net positions of
speculators—that is, whether they are net long or net short.
Because the reasoning above suggests that excessive net long spec-
ulation leads to price increases (and excessive net short specula-
tion leads to price decreases), we preferred to give equal weight
to both commercial and noncommercial trading activities and to
measure speculation based on the deviation between the two. In
a perfectly competitive commodity market, there should be no
deviation between commercial and noncommercial trading activi-
ties. To meet commercial traders’ demand for hedging, at most an
equal number of noncommercial traders’ contracts is necessary.8
However, we have observed a signiﬁcant difference between com-
mercial and noncommercial positions. This could be associated with
the existence of signiﬁcant unsettled noncommercial positions for
extended periods of time motivated by speculative behaviors and
the increasing use of food commodities as an asset class. Thus, cap-
turing the speculative effect using the excessive open interest of
speculative futures seems a more appropriate way than using the
Working ratio. Technically, the extent of excessive speculative activ-
ities in month t is measured as:
ESVt ¼
PNt
d¼1½ðNCLd  NCSdÞ  ðCLd  CSdÞ
Nt
; ð3Þ
with Nt denoting the number of days d per month t where CFTC
position data are available. As the trading position data are pub-
lished every Friday for the preceding Tuesday, there are only four
to ﬁve observations per month. NCL is the open interest of noncom-
mercial long positions in a trading day, NCS is the open interest of
noncommercial short positions in a trading day, CL is the open
interest of commercial long positions in a day, and CS is the open
interest of commercial short positions in a day.
Price volatility is a long-term price movement indicating the
risk associated with price changes. It is usually measured in terms
of price dispersion from the mean. Realized total volatility is mea-
sured in terms of the coefﬁcient of price variations (CV) that cap-
tures both monthly and yearly variability. The normal coefﬁcient
of variation captures only the monthly price variability in a year.
However, the mean price is changing over years and thus unable
to capture inter-year price variability. To capture both changes,
we divided each year’s standard deviation by the mean price of
the entire sample. This allows us to measure variability relative










where y indicates year, m month, and t month by year.
Table 2
Historic quantitative impact of speculation on price spikes.
Maize (%) Wheat (%) Soybean (%)
Price spike due to one standard deviation increase in speculation 2.2 1.6 1.4
Average monthly price spike due to speculation during July-2007 and June-2008 3.2 0.2 1.8
Compound (12-months) price spike due to speculation during July-2007 and June-2008 37.9 2.5 22.1
Note: The ﬁrst row was calculated by multiplying the standard deviation of speculation by the respective speculation coefﬁcient in Table 1 for the full sample. The second row
was calculated by multiplying the average monthly speculation volume between July 2007 and June 2008 with the respective speculation coefﬁcient in Table 1; for the third
row, the value of the second row was multiplied by the number of months (12).
9 Many studies use the US consumer price index. However, this could be a biased
deﬂator that fails to account for the higher budget share of food in developing
countries. For comparison, real (based on US CPI) and nominal prices are presented in
Appendix 2. The real and nominal prices have similar trends and movements over
time.
10 Data are available at http://www.usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/
viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1194 (accessed 18.02.13).
11 Data are available at http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTrad-
ers/HistoricalCompressed/index.htm (accessed 18.02.13).
12 The anticipation effect vanishes, however, for a lead of two or more months.
122 G. Tadesse et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 117–128This metric does not measure direction, but rather appraises
price risks. This means that high variability does not necessarily
reﬂect high price. Realized total volatility is the sum of high- and
low-frequency volatility (Peterson and Tombek, 2005; Karali and
Power, 2009; Roache, 2010). While high-frequency volatility is
related to price spikes, low-frequency volatility is related to cycli-
cal movement of agricultural prices. Since high-frequency volatil-
ity is already modeled in the price spikes equation, we do not
disaggregate volatility into its high- and low-frequency compo-
nents. Instead we attempt to explain the realized total volatility
using the percentage of annual standard deviation from the long-
term average price.
Volatility is estimated using a panel regression in which com-
modities are represented as panels and years as time variable.
Two alternative speciﬁcations, using OLS and feasible generalized
least squares (FGLS), have been adopted. The ﬁrst, which assumes
no heterogeneity across commodities, is formally expressed as
Viy ¼ aþ b0Xiy þ eiy; ð4Þ
where i and y denote commodities and years respectively, and X
consists of the aforementioned explanatory variables—that is, sup-
ply shocks, volatility of oil price, global nominal economic growth
rates, beginning stock-to-use ratios, excessive speculative futures
volume, and, alternatively to speculation, an annual ﬁnancial crisis
indicator. The supply shock variable is measured as the normalized
deviation of total annual production from its long-term trend to
account for the market size of each commodity. Formally, normal-
ized supply shocks are given by SS ¼ jQtHQt jHQt , where Qt is the world
production for each speciﬁc commodity and HQt is the Hodrick-
Prescott smoothed production times series. Shocks derived from
the production series using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter have a simi-
lar distribution to those obtained with other time-series ﬁlters such
as Baxter-King, Butterworth, and Christiane-Fitzgerald. However,
the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter is preferred because it considers extreme
values (Baum, 2006). All the variables in this equation are measured
annually.
The FGLS speciﬁcation with ﬁxed effects controls instead for
heterogeneity among commodities and is expressed as
Viy ¼ aþ b0Xiy þ ci þ eiy; ð5Þ
where ci denotes the ﬁxed effect.
To complete the empirical assessment and to account for
endogenous shock ampliﬁers, a price trigger model has been com-
puted. The impact of a price trigger might be different at high and
low prices. When prices are getting high, markets are expected be
more sensitive to a given shock than when prices are low. This
effect is sometimes referred to as tipping effect. The tipping effect
is estimated using a quantile regression in order to capture the
effect of explanatory variables at lower and upper tips of the
response variable (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Put differently, it
measures how an explanatory variable affects the sth quantile of
the response variable as opposed to the mean value of the response
variable in OLS. It helps to compare the effect at the upper and
lower tail of the price distribution. Eqs. (2) and (4) are estimated
at sth quantile, where s e {0.05, 0.15, 0.25 . . .0.95}. If a variable issigniﬁcant and has a higher effect at the upper tail, the variable
indeed triggers price changes. In the price spike equation, lower
quantiles represent negative values and upper quantiles positive
values. In the volatility equation, both lower and upper quantile
are positive values with the upper quantile denoting higher values.
Data
The nominal prices of maize, wheat, soybeans, and crude oil
were collected from the World Bank database (World Bank,
2011). We used current prices quoted as ‘‘US No. 2 yellow f.o.b’’
for maize, ‘‘US HRW’’ for wheat, ‘‘c.i.f. Rotterdam’’ for soybeans,
and ‘‘average spot prices of Brent, Dubai, andWest Texas’’ for crude
oil. Nominal prices were chosen because of the lack of an accurate
consumer price index for deﬂating world prices.9 Although differ-
ent sample periods are used for different analyses, most of the data-
sets are based on data from 1986 to 2009. Position data before 1986
are missing, and production data after 2009 are missing.
Data for annual supply shocks estimation were collected from
FAO (FAO, 2011)—speciﬁcally, annual production data of the major
producing countries. Data for monthly supply shocks were
obtained from the world agricultural supply and demand estimates
published monthly by the USDA.10 Open interest of futures trading
of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) were obtained from the CFTC
for maize, wheat, and soybeans.11 The CFTC reports disaggregated
open interest of futures trading positions as long, short, and spread
by commercial and noncommercial participants. Since a spread rep-
resents the equal value of long and short positions, it is not included
in our calculation of excessive speculative activities.
Results and discussion
Determinants of food price spikes
Results of the seemingly unrelated regression estimates for dif-
ferent time periods are presented in Table 1. Production is led by
1 month as it is presumed that markets anticipate supply shocks
slightly before the publication of the USDA estimates as a result
of private market research and information acquisition.12 As
expected, price spikes are negatively correlated with (anticipated)
supply shocks and positively correlated with economic growth
(demand) shocks. The results show a positive and signiﬁcant effect
of excessive speculative activities on food price spikes, although
anticipation of supply and demand shocks is controlled for. The
extent of excessive speculation is signiﬁcant both before and after
Table 3
OLS and FGLS regression results for food price volatility.









Normalized production shock in millions of
tons
0.3773** 0.2138*** 0.3395 0.1608 0.3690*** 0.1865*** 0.3340 0.1438
(2.31) (2.35) (1.10) (1.10) (2.40) (2.47) (1.56) (1.56)
Oil price coefﬁcient of variation 0.3595*** 0.4202*** 0.3506*** 0.4939*** 0.3801*** 0.4306*** 0.3771*** 0.5031***
(7.29) (6.76) (5.20) (5.20) (6.63) (5.87) (6.84) (6.84)
Beginning stock-to-use 0.1020 0.3405 0.0385 0.1002 0.1067 0.3862 0.0894 0.2526
(1.35) (1.35) (0.41) (0.41) (1.50) (1.47) (0.94) (0.94)
GDP growth rate 0.0132** 0.5629*** 0.0130*** 0.4552*** 0.0038 0.1793 0.0035 0.1322
(2.24) (2.34) (7.14) (7.14) (0.48) (0.48) (0.44) (0.44)
Speculation (1000 contracts) 0.00001 0.0714 0.0001 0.0839
(1.39) (1.64) (1.66) (1.66)
Financial crisis index 0.0007** 0.3915** 0.0007** 0.3417**
(1.96) (2.05) (2.30) (2.30)
R2 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.58
Breusch-Pagan LM test Prob = 0.823 Prob = 0.936
Modiﬁed Wald test Prob = 0.274 Prob = 0.939
Wooldridge test Prob = 0.549 Prob = 0.601
Number of obs. 69 69 69 69 88 88 88 88
Note: Dependent variable: Food price volatility. t-values are in brackets. The models control for heteroskedasticity using the VCE robust estimator. Elasticities are calculated
as marginal effects at mean values. Diagnostic checking rejects the presence of cross-sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation. The Breusch-Pagan LM
test (Ho: no cross-sectional dependence) reveals that there is independence, thus residuals are not contemporaneously correlated. The modiﬁed Wald test for groupwise
heteroskedasticity (Ho: homoscedasticity) does not reject the null and concludes for homoscedasticity. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Ho: no serial
correlation) fails to reject the null and concludes that data do not have ﬁrst-order autocorrelation.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
G. Tadesse et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 117–128 1232000. However, the effect is stronger after 2000 than before. There
exists a strong belief among ﬁnancial practitioners that speculative
activity became detrimental only after 2000, when commodity mar-
kets were deregulated and ﬁnancialization intensiﬁed (UNCTAD,
2011). For example, Gheit (2008), Masters (2008), and Frenk
(2010) among others, argued that since the 2000 Commodity Futures
Modernization Act, ‘‘speculative money’’ has been ﬂowing into com-
modity derivatives, which in turn drives commodity spot prices up
and down far beyond their fundamental values. Our results, together
with the research of Gilbert (2010) and Henderson et al. (2012) pro-
vide further evidence of this claim.
Although the coefﬁcient of speculation variable is smallest for
maize and largest for wheat, variation of speculation is much larger
for maize than for wheat. Table 2 indicates the impact of one stan-
dard deviation change of speculation on spikes, showing that
maize price spikes are more affected by speculation than wheat
price spikes are. Regarding the role of speculation in the 2007–
2008 crisis, excessive speculation predicts that ceteribus paribus
an approximate 38% increase of the maize price within the
12 months following July 2007 but an increase of only less than
3% for wheat. These numbers must be treated with caution, how-
ever, because not only is speculation caused by exogenous (ﬁnan-
cial market) events, but it is also endogenous to price expectations.
By considering anticipated information on market fundamentals,
speculation could be endogenous to other factors that inﬂuence
price expectations, such as export bans, that are difﬁcult to control
for. Financial market shocks, however, constitute a clear exogenous
element in the speculation variable.1313 There are two standard approaches to dealing with endogeneity: lagging
variables and instrument variables. In our case, both are problematic. A one-month
lag of data on speculation is already too long; ﬁnancial markets operate on a daily
basis, and speculative activities a month previous should not have an impact on price
spikes. Selection of appropriate instrument variables that explain speculation volume
due to ﬁnancial market shocks should be guided by a portfolio model, such as the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This model, however, considers complex
relationships between expected returns, variances, and co-variances among many
different assets, which cannot be subsumed under a linear combination of a few
ﬁnancial market variables.The results further suggest the role of anticipated production
ﬂuctuations as an important cause of short-term food price
spikes. Supply shocks measured by USDA monthly forecasts were
found to be statistically signiﬁcant in most of the estimations.
Production shocks were included to represent extreme weather
or ﬂood outbreaks that could lead to supply shortfalls in one
part of the world and expectations in other parts of the world.
For example, a ﬂood in Australia may affect food supply from
Australia and farmers’ and traders’ price expectations in Europe
or the United States. These effects were supposed to cause tem-
porary price spikes. The results conﬁrm that expectations about
production inﬂuence prices. Thus, short-term price spikes are
partly created by information about supply related to weather
events.
Oil price spikes have had increasing effects on food price
spikes over time (Table 1). Before 2000, the effect was insigniﬁ-
cant or negative (wheat). After 2000, however, it became posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant for maize, wheat, and soybean
prices. As mentioned above, oil prices are linked to food prices
through demand (biofuels), supply channels (cost of production),
and to increased index-fund activities. The signiﬁcance of the
impact of oil prices on food prices in recent years suggests that
demand factors and ﬁnancialization dynamics are more relevant
than supply factors in explaining price increases. The United
States accounts for about 40% of world maize production. In
2010, about 40% of the total US maize harvest was consumed
by ethanol producers (USDA, 2013). Increasing demand for bio-
fuel affects prices not only through a direct conversion of food
crops to feedstock, but also through the reallocation of produc-
tion resources, such as land and water, to the production of bio-
fuel commodities. Reallocation of production resources affects
non-biofuel food commodities as well. The link between oil
and food prices is more important than the actual scarcity
caused by biofuel demand for the incidence of short-term food
price spikes. When energy prices are linked to food prices, polit-
ical, environmental, and commercial shocks can easily translate
to food crises. Stock-to-use ratios are insigniﬁcant, except for
wheat since 2000, for which low stocks increased spikes.
Fig. 3. Triggers of food price spikes. Note: The middle line shows the coefﬁcient explaining price spikes according to (a) oil price shocks, (b) production shocks, (c) excessive
speculation and (d) stock-to-use ratios. The quantile regression shows the coefﬁcients for different quantiles of commodity price spikes. At a low quantile, the corresponding
coefﬁcient shows the impact on price spikes when price spikes are low; at a high quantile, the corresponding coefﬁcient shows the impact on price spikes when price spikes
are already high. Shaded regions are 95% conﬁdence intervals, and the line in the middle is the coefﬁcient. Source: Authors’ estimation based on data explained in Sections
‘Estimation methods’ and ‘Data’.
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A panel analysis is used to quantify the relative importance of
supply, demand, and ﬁnancial shocks on food price volatility. The
explanatory variables included in this volatility equation are the
same as above, except for two differences. First, the variables are
measured on an annual basis; for example, the normalized supply
shock, the GDP growth, and the beginning stock-to-use ratios arecalculated using annual data, excessive speculation is calculated
based on the number of marketing days in a year, and oil price vol-
atility is measured based on annual coefﬁcients of variation. Sec-
ond, we also included the ﬁnancial crisis index developed by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). This index combines measures of
banking crises, foreign debt defaults, domestic debt defaults, inﬂa-
tion crises, and exchange rate crises. The index serves as a proxy
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Fig. 4. Triggers of global food price volatility. Note: The middle line shows the coefﬁcient explaining food price volatility according to different explanatory variables. The
quantile regression shows the coefﬁcients for different quantiles of food price volatility. At a low quantile, the corresponding coefﬁcient shows the impact on price volatility
when volatility is low; at a high quantile, the corresponding coefﬁcient shows the impact on price volatility when volatility is high. Shaded regions are 95% conﬁdence
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G. Tadesse et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 117–128 125market, and hence speculation and the ﬁnancial crisis index are
used alternatively.
The different estimates of the models are presented in Table 3. A
comparison of the effect of an excessive volume of futures trading
and the ﬁnancial crisis index on volatility indicates the importance
of commodity-speciﬁc and common economic factors in affecting
food prices. The result clearly shows the insigniﬁcance of futures
trading on volatility, which is in contrast with the results of the
price spikes estimation. This underlines the importance of distin-
guishing between volatility and spikes in this type of analysis. Con-
versely, the effect of the ﬁnancial crisis index is signiﬁcant and
robust across all speciﬁcations, implying that the ﬁnancial crisis
is more relevant than excessive futures trading in explaining food
price volatility.14 It is worth noting that in terms of elasticity, a 1%
increase in the ﬁnancial crisis index leads to a rise in price volatility
of about 0.40% in the OLS estimation and 0.35% in FGLS estimation.
The positive relationship between the ﬁnancial crisis index and food
price volatility implies the signiﬁcance of food commodities as ﬁnan-
cial instruments. When banks, sovereign debt, and exchange rates
experience a crisis, the food market enters a crisis too.
The normalized supply shock variable has a statistically signif-
icant effect on food price volatility when the restriction of homoge-
neity is imposed. The variable turns out not to be signiﬁcant when
the restriction is relaxed. This could be due to the fact that heter-
ogeneous production shocks can offset each other because of geo-
graphical variation without affecting price volatility. In the
presence of homogeneity, extreme weather events exert an effect
on the food crisis and agricultural risks.14 We also estimated the models using the lagged values of the speculation and
ﬁnancial crisis variables. Although this is a nice way to technically correct for
endogeneity, the economic sense behind this choice could be questioned because it
would imply that one-year lagged ﬁnancial variables can inﬂuence current price
volatility. For this reason we preferred to consider only the current values of all the
variables.The results show that oil prices and GDP—which can be viewed
mainly as demand-side shocks—have a stronger impact than mar-
ket shocks (speculative volumes and ﬁnancial crisis), and supply-
side shocks in explaining food price volatility when they are sig--0.1
maize wheat soybean
1986 -1999 2000 -2011
Fig. A.1. Correlations among factors affecting food prices. Notes: All the variables
are measured annually. The ﬁgures show the correlation coefﬁcients. The darker
bars show correlation coefﬁcients before 2000, and the light shaded bars show
coefﬁcients after 2000. Source: Authors’ estimation based on the data explained in
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Fig. A.2. Trends and movements of nominal and real prices. Note: Both lines show monthly prices. The upper blue line shows nominal prices, and the lower red line shows
real monthly prices. The real price is calculated as the ratio of nominal price to the US consumer price index. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) Source: Authors’ estimation based on World Bank (2011) nominal prices.
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and GDP growth on food price volatility is higher than the effect
of speculation and supply shocks. Speciﬁcally, a 1% increase in oil
price volatility leads to a rise of 0.42–0.45% in food price volatility
when the model controls for speculation. When the ﬁnancial
index is included, volatility rises by 0.43–0.50%. A 1% upsurge in
global growth rates generates an increase of 0.56% and 0.45%
when the model controls for speculation. The variable becomes
insigniﬁcant when the ﬁnancial crisis is considered. The impor-
tance of oil prices in explaining food price spikes and volatility
suggests that food and energy markets have become more
interwoven.
The variable stock-to-use ratio turns out to be insigniﬁcant in
explaining food price volatility. As described in the theoretical sec-
tion, the effect of exogenous shocks depends on the economic and
political environment. If the stock-to-use ratio is low in times of
ﬁnancial and environmental shocks, exogenous shocks may well
have a greater impact than they would if stocks were high. As
we control for exogenous shocks in the models, the direct impact
of stocks on volatility might vanish. This may suggest that the
stock-to-use ratio is an ampliﬁer or intermediate variable that
reﬂects the effect of market supply and demand shocks on food
price volatility.
In sum, determinants of price spikes and price volatility are
somehow different at least in terms of level of signiﬁcance and
the magnitude of marginal effects. Market-related shocks (specu-
lation) affect price spikes much more than demand- and supply-
side shocks. In contrast, demand-side shocks (oil prices and GDP)
lead to higher price volatility than market and supply-side
shocks.Food price triggers
Recent food price discussions indicate the possibility of tipping
points where the ‘‘normal’’ response of markets changes and exag-
geration and overreactions might occur. In order to identify trig-
gers and test the tipping point hypothesis, we estimated a series
of quantile regressions for both the price spike and volatility equa-
tions. The quantile regressions indicate at which price or volatility
levels the dynamics of price spikes and price volatility changes (or,
whether the dynamics estimated in Tables 1 and 3 are robust for all
price and volatility levels). In the price spike equation, the effects
of oil prices, speculative futures trading, and supply shocks are
compared at high and lower prices. In the volatility equation, the
effects of supply shocks, oil price volatility, and the ﬁnancial crisis
index are compared at lower and higher volatility. The tips in the
price spike and price volatility equations are therefore different.
In the price spike equation, the upper tip is the highest spike, but
in the price volatility equation a high quantile refers to high
volatility.
The results are presented in Figs. 3 and 4. The ﬁgures show the
marginal effects of explanatory variables on response variables at
different level of quantiles. The line graphs indicate point esti-
mates, and the shaded regions show the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
A variable is said to be a trigger if the conﬁdence intervals do not
include zero values in the shaded region and the line graph is vis-
ibly increasing (if the relationship between food price and variable
is positive) or decreasing (if the relationship between food price
and the variable is positive) as the quantile increases. The results
of triggering price spikes are mixed. Of all the variables included
in price spike equation (Fig. 3), only the production shock for maize
G. Tadesse et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 117–128 127and wheat and speculation for maize show trigger effects. Other
variables such as oil prices and stock-to-use ratio have no trigger
effects, as depicted by ﬂat and insigniﬁcant marginal values over
quantiles.
The effect of production shocks on price spikes is getting bigger
and bigger as the quantile increases except for soybeans. This
result could imply that the USDA production forecasts have a larger
impact on price movements when prices are high than when they
are low. Thus, production shocks are a signiﬁcant contributor to
food price spikes.
The u-shape visible in the quantile regressions for speculation
suggests that speculation is more important in times of extreme
price dynamics. An increasing price trend, driven by changes in
fundamentals (commodity demand and supply), gives rise to mar-
ket nervousness that brings speculators to overheat the market.
Speculation is also observed to have a strong impact on price
spikes at lower quantiles of price spikes. This is an indication of
the stabilization effect of speculation when markets are calm.
When markets are drowning, since the lower spike quantiles are
negative values, an increase in speculative activities restores mar-
ket prices. In sum, speculative actions have the capacity to create
price hikes and reduce price slumps.
Results from the volatility quantile regression suggest the
importance of oil prices in triggering food price volatility (Fig. 4).
The effects of supply shocks, stock-to-use ratio, and global GDP
growth also increase over quantiles, but they all are statistically
insigniﬁcant. The evidence also shows that ﬁnancial crisis and
speculation do not necessarily trigger volatility, in contrast to price
spikes as shown in the quantile analysis above.
Oil prices have remained a prime factor in extreme volatility in
food prices. Apart from the production and biofuel effects, oil
prices affect food price volatility though a real income effect
because of their dominant impact on the overall economy. The trig-
ger effect may be associated with the interaction of these effects.
All the effects are displayed at higher level of food prices.Conclusions
This study has investigated the main drivers of food price spikes
and volatility for wheat, maize, and soybeans, and shown how
these factors trigger crisis at extreme price changes. The analysis
has indicated that exogenous shocks as well as the linkages
between food, energy, and ﬁnancial markets play a signiﬁcant role
in explaining food price volatility and spikes.
In addition to demand and supply shocks, speculation is an
important factor in explaining and triggering extreme price spikes.
Excessive speculation is more strongly associated with price spikes
at extreme positive price changes than with negative price
changes, implying that the stabilizing effect of speculation through
price discovery is smaller than its destabilizing effect through cre-
ating market bubbles.
The results also conﬁrm that supply shocks are reﬂected in price
spikes and that the effect of oil price shocks is greater for price risk
than for food crisis. The effect of oil prices on food price spikes has
emerged as signiﬁcant only in recent years. Financial crisis exerts a
strong impact on food price volatility, which conﬁrms the increas-
ing link between ﬁnancial and commodity markets.
On the basis of the empirical results, it seems opportune for
policy makers to prevent excessive speculative behaviors in the
commodity market in order to reduce price spikes and prevent
short-term food crises. In this context, caps on trading under
extreme market situations, or taxation of food commodity futures
trading along the lines of the Tobin tax, could be framed. Designing
ﬂexible biofuel policies that are responsive to the food supply sit-
uation can also help stabilize prices and reduce volatility spilloversfrom oil markets in times of food crisis. Recent changes in the US
biofuel mandate, for example, include ﬂexibility mechanisms that
allow for relaxing the blending requirement in one year if compen-
sated in another year.
Improving the market information base would further help all
market actors to form expectations based on fundamentals and
to detect shortages early. While the Agricultural Market Informa-
tion System (AMIS) initiative of the G20 strives for higher transpar-
ency, sufﬁcient contributions from some member states are still
lacking.
Recent developments in many countries to increase national
grain stocks to reduce volatility and import dependency lead to
increased grain scarcity and thus higher prices in the short run.
International levels of storage are, however, only one option to
reduce volatility, which turned out to be mostly insigniﬁcant in
our analyses. One reason might be lack of cooperation: govern-
ments building stocks only for their citizens tend to complement
storage policies with trade restrictions, which effectively withdraw
their stocks from the global grain market. Such collective action
failure needs to be addressed in regional and global trade talks that
should also consider the international consequences of national
stock-holding policies.
Besides policies to reduce volatility and extreme price spikes,
governments can increase resilience of producers and consumers
to deal with price changes. This can be done by supporting contract
farming and price insurance mechanisms on the production side
and by enhancing safety nets and access to ﬁnancial services on
the consumer side.
Governments and their international associations such as the
G20 should therefore carefully analyze all available options for
preventing food price spikes and volatility—from interventions in
ﬁnancial markets to biofuel policies—and they should also
facilitate market information.
Appendix
See Figs. A.1 and A.2.References
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